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the situation in the Caribbean area. This in-
cludes, on the part of the Soviet Union, the
voluntary suspension for 2 to 3 weeks of
arms stockpiling in Cuba, and, on the part
of the USA, the voluntary suspension for
the same period of its “quarantine” activity,
including the inspection of ships bound for
Cuba.
To judge from Kennedy’s response, the
USA is attempting to put forth as the basis
of its negotiations its demand for the re-
moval of “offensive weaponry” from Cuba.
For this reason we should expect that
the Americans will not agree to the suspen-
sion of “quarantine” activity unless this de-
mand of theirs is met.
We of course firmly reject any attempts
by the USA to impose stipulations either on
us or on Cuba. In this matter we will pro-
ceed from the condition that negotiations can
only be conducted on the basis of U Thant’s
proposal, that is on the basis of the point
about suspending arms stockpiling in Cuba,
a proposal which the neutral countries sup-
port.
The possibility cannot be ruled out that
U Thant, under American influence, is at-
tempting to put forth as a primary measure
the proposals made by him in his second
message to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, es-
pecially the one stipulating that Soviet ves-
sels bound for Cuba keep away from the
interception area for a certain period of time,
and that the USA for the duration of that
same period avoid immediate encounters
between their ships and Soviet vessels. In
this event we will declare that U Thant’s
proposal, which is the basis on which all the
interested parties have agreed to conduct ne-
gotiations, goes above and beyond the “pri-
mary measures” that he put forth in his sec-
ond message.
Since the forthcoming meeting with U
Thant is a preliminary one and raises the
issue of further negotiations, including a
conclusive normalization of the whole situ-
ation in the Caribbean region, we ask to be
briefed on your decision as to the level,
form, and direction of further negotiations.
If there are supplementary instructions
for the first meeting with U Thant, we ask
you to take into consideration the meeting
time proposed by U Thant.
25.X.62 V. ZORIN
[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian
Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-
tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro-
vided to CWIHP, and on file at National
Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-
lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-
sity.]
Telegram from Soviet delegate to the
United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR
Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962
26 October 1962
The Cuban delegate, Garcia-
Inchaustegui, met with U Thant on 26 Oc-
tober, at which time U Thant entrusted him
to deliver to Havana a message from him to
Fidel Castro (we are sending this as a sepa-
rate telegram).
In the conversation with Garcia-
Inchaustegui, U Thant, who had informed
him of the correspondence between U Thant
and Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, and Presi-
dent Kennedy as well, expressed his ideas
for using Dorticos’s proposal of 8 October
in the General Assembly as a way to achieve
a lasting normalization of the Caribbean
basin situation. The Cuban reminded U
Thant that Dorticos in his speech had em-
phasized the extenuating circumstance that
the USA had already declared that it did not
intend to attack Cuba, but that now it had
broken their promise.
To this U Thant responded that for this
reason it is necessary to specify what guar-
antees should be made by the USA to as-
sure that it will not take any antagonistic
actions against Cuba, and asked Garcia-
Inchaustegui to explain the views of the
Cuban government on this matter.
2. The head of the Brazilian delegation,
[Alfonso] Arinos [de Melo Franco], has
worked out a draft resolution on the de-
nuclearization of Latin America and Africa
under the observation of a monitoring com-
mittee (we will send this as a separate tele-
gram). In a conversation with Garcia-
Inchaustegui, Arinos expressed his view that
approving this resolution would allow Cuba
to “avoid humiliation” if it is forced to re-
nounce the construction of missile bases.
According to Garcia-Inchaustegui, this
draft resolution has received great currency
among the Latin American countries, and
the delegates from the Latin American con-
tingents who met with U Thant this evening
should discuss the draft with the acting Sec-
retary General.
Garcia-Inchaustegui told the Brazilian
himself that, in his personal opinion, it
would be better that the issue of the elimi-
nation of all foreign military bases in Latin
America be brought up, since then such a
formulation would include the base at
Guantanamo as well.
26.X.62 V. ZORIN
[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian
Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-
tained by NHK (Japanese Television), pro-
vided to CWIHP, and on file at National
Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans-
lation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-
sity.]
Telegram from Soviet delegate to the
United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR
Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962
26 October 1962
I delivered N.S. Khrushchev’s response
to U Thant’s second message (at 13:00 lo-
cal time).
U Thant expressed satisfaction with the
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 289
fact that once again his proposal had been
approved. After this, U Thant told us that
tonight he had received a response to his
second message from Kennedy as well, and
at our insistence he provided us with the text
of that response (after he had submitted this
disclosure to the approval of the USA lega-
tion, and after receiving our consent to his
disclosing to the USA legation the content
of our own response).
We are communicating the text of
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