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University on 6-11 August 1995.
CWIHP, in cooperation with the National
Security Archive (a non-governmental reposi-
tory for declassified documents and research
institute located at George Washington Univer-
sity), co-organized three panels at the Warsaw
meeting. Two were chaired by CWIHP Director
Jim Hershberg: “New Evidence on the Polish
Crisis, 1980-1981,” with presentations by Mark
Kramer (Russian Research Center, Harvard Uni-
versity), Michael Kubina (Free University, Ber-
lin), and Malcolm Byrne (National Security
Archive); and “Cold War Flashpoints,” with
Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive),
Johanna Granville (Carnegie-Mellon Univer-
sity), Byrne, and Kramer.
Malcolm Byrne
chaired a session on “New Opportunities for
Research and the Issue of Openness in Cold War
Studies,” with presentations by Hope Harrison
(Lafayette College), Sven Holtsmark (Norwe-
gian Institute for Defense Studies), Hershberg,
and Zubok.
During the conference, CWIHP, the Na-
tional Security Archive, and the Institute of
Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences,
conducted a day-long workshop on current schol-
arship and research on the 1980-81 Polish Cri-
sis. CWIHP presented a collection of newly-
released Soviet documents on the crisis, in-
cluded Politburo minutes, selected, translated,
annotated, and introduced by Mark Kramer,
while the Archive assembled declassified U.S.
documents obtained through the Freedom of
Information Act. Plans were discussed to hold
an oral history conference on the 1980-81 Polish
Crisis, gathering key Polish, Russian, and Ameri-
cans involved in the events, in the spring of 1997
in Poland. Meetings were also held with Ger-
man and Hungarian colleagues regarding, re-
spectively, meetings for scholars to present new
East-bloc evidence on the 1953 East German
uprising and the 1956 Hungarian crisis which
are planned in connection with the National
Security Archive’s “Cold War Flashpoints”
project and will be co-sponsored by CWIHP.
In conjunction with the Warsaw gathering,
Hershberg and Byrne gave presentations re-
garding CWIHP’s and the Archive’s activities
at the International Librarians’ Conference on
Libraries in Europe’s Post-Communist Coun-
tries, held near Krakow, Poland, at Jagellonian
University’s Polonia Institute (Przegorzaly) on
3-5 August 1995.
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 120
Cumings and Weathersby—An
11 July 1995
trary, charged Kim two percent—about what
mander of the Korean Military Advisory
mortgages cost in the U.S. then.)
Group (KMAG) “to recover high ground in
To the Editor:
Document #7, Stalin’s telegram to Rus-
North Korea occupied by [the] South Ko-
sian ambassador to P’yôngyang Shtykov on
rean Army.” Before dawn it launched strong
Since Kathryn Weathersby chose once
30 January 1950, does not say what
artillery barrages and then at 5:30 a.m., 4000
again to stigmatize my work (as “revision-
Weathersby says it does, namely, it does not
to 6000 North Korean border guards at-
ist”) in the spring 1995 issue of the CWIHP
“reveal so bluntly” Stalin’s strategic think-
tacked the salient. They routed the South
Bulletin, perhaps I might be permitted a
ing or his “perfect mafioso style.” Instead it
Korean defenders, destroying two compa-
comment. The documents that she repro-
shows Stalin appearing to be more interested
nies of ROK soldiers and leaving hundreds
duced, selectively culled from a vastly larger
than at any previous point in Kim Il Sung’s
dead.
archive and handcarried to Seoul by a Boris
plans for South Korea, without a hint of what
Virtual panic ensued at high levels of
Yeltsin beseeching South Korea to aid the
Stalin’s own strategic thinking might be. Dr.
the South Korean government, leading
faltering Russian economy, are quite inter-
Weathersby thinks the timing of this change
Syngman Rhee and his favored high officers
esting but in ways that she does not seem to
is to be explained by Dean Acheson’s famed
in the army to argue that the only way to
understand.
press club speech on January 12, which is to
relieve pressure on Ongjin was to drive
Document #1, a standard transcript of
assume a Stalin so inexperienced as to take
north to Ch’orwon—which happened to be
Kim Il Sung’s meeting with Stalin on 5
Acheson’s public statement of a private policy
about 20 miles into North Korean territory.
March 1949 widely circulated for use inside
at face value (and even the public statement
Rhee, who was meeting with Chiang Kai-
the Soviet government, is impressive pri-
is always misread by scholars). Finally,
shek [Jiang Jieshi] in a southern Korean
marily for how bland it is, adding very little
Stalin’s request that Kim send 25,000 tons of
port, returned to Seoul and dressed down his
to the existing record. If anything it illus-
lead (whether gratis or for a price is not
defense minister for not having “attacked
trates how distant Stalin was from the Ko-
mentioned) is no more “mafioso” than the
the North” after the Ongjin debacle. The
rean situation, probing Kim on what kind of
U.S. more or less telling South Korea that it
American ambassador and the KMAG com-
an army he had, what kind South Korea had,
would require Korea’s entire annual output
mander both intervened, since an attack on
and whether he had utilized the “national
of tungsten in the early 1950s, to make up for
Ch’orwon would, in the words of the latter,
bourgeoisie” to organize trade (which Kim
the lost tungsten supplies of southern China.
“cause heavy civil war and might spread.”
indeed had done). This transcript adds
Documents number two through six are
The South did not move against Ch’orwon,
virtually nothing to what has been known of
considerably more interesting, but remain
but attacks from both sides across the paral-
this meeting, a relatively full record of which
inexplicable unless placed against the back-
lel on the Ongjin peninsula continued through
can be found in an archive of captured North
and-forth logic of the developing civil con-
the end of 1949.
Korean materials in Washington. But it
flict on the peninsula, with full knowledge of
All this is based on unimpeachable
does appear to show that no secret military
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